We write to follow up on the editorial 1 on the use of statistical aggregates. We focus on the reaction, in it, to the letter from two of us (MPC and DS) in the same issue suggesting that the 'longer (average) life expectancy of popes relative to artists 2 reflects the lives characterized by social instability, high-risk behaviours and geographical mobility (and thus infection risk) of the artists.' The Editorial presented evidence that the 'assumption of better behaviour by the popes is perhaps unjustified'. We have now looked behind the summary longevity statistics, and present individualized data showing that the initial, but tentative, conclusion about their longer life expectancy should be reversed. Even if the assumption of better behaviour 'on average' of popes is justified, these behaviours were not-even on average-accompanied by longer life expectancy. We now show the longevity data in Figure 1 , using the Lexis diagram, 3 a device sadly neglected by modern epidemiologists.
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It plots advancing age on the vertical, and calendar time on the horizontal, axis. The 'pope-years' (i.e. after they were elected) are shown in black and the artist-years (all of them) in grey. In the initial report, the statistics, aggregated over centuries, suggested that popes had a longevity advantage of several years. However, if we proceed papacy by papacy, the inter-ocular traumatic test 4 (IOTT)-another under-used analytic deviceapplied to Figure 1 reveals that among those who were alive at the age at which each papacy commenced, the average remaining life of the popes was shorter than that of the corresponding peer artists-at least up until 1750 or so, after which the distributions became more similar. The principal cause of this reversal is the phenomenon that the first analysis of this dataset sought to remove, namely that 'Popes had to have reached a certain age before being elected to the papacy'. In that analysis, the statistical approach did not fully address this constraint. Ideally, for each papacy-specific 'longevity competition', the time-clock should start when the pope is elected, and the competition should include the pope, and those artists born the same year as he, who were still alive when he was elected. However, for several papacies, such detailed matching is not possible. Instead, for each of the 1200-1599 papacies, the previous analysis effectively 'started the clock' at age 39-the age at which the youngest pope in that era was elected-by excluding artists who died before reaching that age. For the 1600-1900 papacies, it was started at age 38.
Unfortunately, under this broad scheme, as is clear from Figure 1 , several artists included in that analysis died before 'their' (and several other) pope(s) were even elected. This inbuilt survival advantage 5, 6 for the popes is an example of what is today called 'immortal time bias'. 7 William Farr described this fallacy in 1843. 8 He noted that the average age at death of bishops is greater than that of curates, and thus-concerned for the underprivileged-suggested that curates should be promoted to bishops, and at an early age, 'for the sake of their health.' Rather than match perfectly on year of birth and age at entry to each longevity competition, one could for example proceed half century by half-century, and determine the youngest age (A min ) at which a pope born (or elected) in that half-century was elected, and compare the post-A min survival of these popes and the corresponding artists. However, these half-century (or even narrower) strata would still contain at least one other pope elected at an age older than A min , after several artists would already have died, and so the competition would continue to be unfair.
In our new analysis, we circumvented this by creating a separate contest (stratum) for each papacy. We started the clock at the age at which the specific pope was elected. We used as a comparison group those artists, born within 25 years of when the pope was, who had reached that same age. For example, in Figure 2 , consider the papacy that began at 1335, when the pope, born in 1280, was 55. Five 'nearby' artists, born in 1260, 1266, 1280, 1284, and 1290, all of whom lived until at least 55, serve as a comparison group. The pope died in 1342, at age 62, after 7 years as pope. His five 'peers' died in 1318, 1337, 1348, 1344 and 1348, respectively, at ages 58, 71, 68, 60, and 58. Thus, their 'post-55' survival times were 3, 16, 13, 5, and 3 years, respectively, so that two lived longer than the pope, by 19 and 16 years, and three lived a shorter amount, i.e. the (artist minus pope) differences were À4, À2 and À4 years. In this approach, some artists serve in several comparisons: for example the artist who lived from 1280 to 1348 competes again in the next papacy, but against a younger pope. One can correct for this 're-use' of some artists, by using robust standard errors, from say a GEE analysis. Figure 3 plots the (artist minus pope) differences. There are too few artists to serve as comparators for 13th century papacies. From the 14th up until the 18th century, the IOTT confirms that the artists tended to outlive the popes. We heed the editorial warning about the dangers of aggregation (in this case, over time rather than people), and thus refrain from giving an overall average; we merely note that the average difference in Figure 3 is positive-statistically so, even when we correct for the 're-use' of some artists. Readers who are not convinced by IOTT's, and who insist on translating the differences into Figure 3 The numbers of years by which artists, who had reached the same age as the Pope was when elected, outlived (positive differences, vertical axis), or were outlived by (negative differences), the Pope cold hazard ratios (HRs), are asked to estimate the overall and the calendar-time-specific HRs by eye. In the earlier analysis, with popes as the reference category, and observations censored at age 70, the HR for artists was 1.50; here, the average HR is decidedly ,1. The ratio varies considerably: it was~0.3 in 1300 and 1.0 in 1800. Narrower windows give similar results. Like the Editor, we too believe that Michelangelo would have recognized the dangers of 'assuming that certain aggregate groups, such as popes, were free from the vices of other aggregate groups, such as artists' or-in this instance-of aggregating over time. Michelangelo would also have liked Aaron Levenstein's (http://politicalgraveyard.com/) quip about statistics: 'what they reveal is suggestive, but what they conceal is vital.' He might also have admired Lexis' 2-D epi-geometry, and Farr's illustration of statistical fallibility ('bias', nowadays), in relation to (im)mortality and religious careers.
For some situations, even the sharpest and best-designed statistical analysis may fail to uncover the truth. Just as 'confounding by indication' is a near-impossible challenge in non-experimental studies of drug efficacy, a similar phenomenon may have been at play here. It is possible that in some periods cardinals prefer to choose healthier or less healthy popes (depending on political circumstances) to try to influence how long they will be in power. We do not statistically investigate the existence of such 'guided' individualized choices, preferring instead to let the data in Figures 1 (after Lexis) and 2 and 3 (dedicated to Farr) speak for themselves.
